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Abstract
We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate
an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for
the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" v s "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract
which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment
required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at
a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative
award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning
without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher
expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate
the contract. In turn, the relative advantages of each award criterion
are affected by the concessioning conditions.
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1

Introduction

"Over the past decades, governments have increasingly turned towards concessions as a way to raise funds and to improve services by applying private-sector
expertise to investment, management and operation of infrastructure" (OECD,
2007, p.15).
The term "concession" has different meanings in different countries. Generally speaking, the term can be used to refer "to any arrangement in which a
firm obtains the right to provide a particular service under conditions of significant market power" (World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank,
1998, p.10).
This broad economic definition, used throughout the paper, allows to include a wide range of legal arrangements concerning the nature and extent of
the risk governments transfer to the franchisee, duration, exclusivity, service
obligations, investment responsibilities, ownership of assets, and so on.
One important difference between contracts is whether the concedent authority imposes stringent rollout time limits for the concessioned service.1 At
one extreme, regulators can eliminate all scope for discretion by imposing the
obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to provide the
service. At the other, contracts can be designed so as to leave a large degree
of autonomy to the franchisee, by simply assigning the right, as distinct from
the obligation, to supply the market. These arrangements constitute a continuum, along which we find concessions which impose service obligations but
give the franchisee a certain amount of time flexibility, and contracts which do
not impose the obligation to supply the market, but the licensee has a limited
amount of time to start using the licence after which it will be revoked.2
Whatever the terms and conditions specified in the contract, a concession
can be granted essentially in three ways: direct negotiations, beauty contests,
1

Although service rollout time limits are often imposed, particularly when concessioning
"socially significant services", such as the provision of potable water, governments also
award contracts which do not impose stringent obligations. This, for example, has occured
in Europe when awarding 3G telecom (UMTS) licences. Many EU Member States did not
specify rollout time limits, and even where specific service launch requirements were set,
regulators agreed to change the date (Northstream, 2002).
2
For example, the Minister for Communications, Information Technology, and the Arts
instructed the Australian Communication Authority (ACA) to impose a use it or loose it
condition on all licences for LPON (Low Power Open Narrowcasting) services that operate
in the 87.5 - 88.0 MHz FM sub-band. Breaching this condition may result in cancellation
of the apparatus licence by, the ACA, or refusal to renew the licence. As argued by ACA,
the main reason to impose a use it or loose it condition is to avoid hoarding, i.e., to prevent
firms from obtaining licences, then not operating them.
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or competitive bidding mechanisms. Although concessions are still frequently
awarded by a selection process based on a subjective evaluation of one or
more quantitative or qualitative criteria, recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in using bidding processes3 , which, particularly when the
service is fairly standard (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001), provide a potentially effective mechanism for stimulating interest among a broader range of potential
investors and selecting the best proposal.
When bidding for concessioning, governments must decide inter alia which
specifications to include for the financial proposals.4 When the contract does
not involve sale of existing assets, awarding authorities frequently base the
bidding on lowest price charged to consumers, or on the highest fee paid by
the concessionaire (or the lowest subsidy paid by the government).5
The debate about the appropriate bidding rule is not new.6 However,
the economics literature has not deeply explored the relation between award
criteria and concessioning conditions, namely how the expected returns of
alternative financial proposals are affected by service launch requirements,
and viceversa, i.e. how the returns of alternative conditions are affected by
the bidding rule used to allocate the contract.
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. In particular, we compare the
two award criteria ("highest concession fee" vs. "lowest price") by looking at
two alternative concessioning conditions which approximate actual practices: a
3

For example, as far as spectrum licences are concerned, New Zealand legislated spectrum auctions in 1989, as did the United Kingdom in 1990. In the United States, where
licences used to be assigned after comparative hearings held by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), and then lotteries, Congress passed legislation giving the FCC the authority to auction licenses in 1993 (McMillan, 1994). More recently, in the E.U., where the
allocation procedures of licences for 3G mobile communications were left to the discretion
of Member States, while several States organised comparative bids, while others opted for
an auction mechanism (Klemperer, 2003)
4
Specifications may include both technical and financial proposals. However, conceding
authorities often adopt a two-stage process whereby technical proposals are evaluated before
proceeding to the financial offers. The winning bidder is then selected on the basis of the
best financial proposal from among those who passed the technical evaluation.
5
Conceding authorities may also base the auction on multiple financial criteria. However, using a single financial criterion tends to increase the transparency of the competitive
process, although this can also be derived by using a pre-specified formula which combines
multiple criteria and which, in the case of the price to consumers and the concession fee,
may reflect the relative weight the government attaches to the consumer surplus and fiscal
revenues.
6
For example, Alfred Marshall argued that "[...] the competition for the franchise shall
turn on the price or the quality, or both, of the services or the goods, rather than on the
annual sum paid for the lease". Quoted in Ekelund and Hebert (1981), p.471.
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contract which imposes the obligation to immediately operate the concessioned
service, and a contract which simply assigns the right to supply the market
without imposing rollout time limits.7 We do this by developing a simple twoperiod model, by assuming that the concessioned service is fairly standard,
the investment required to operate the service is irreversible and potential
operators face a stochastic demand. Moreover, in order to avoid effects arising
from assigning arbitrary weights to the consumer surplus and fiscal revenue,
the comparative welfare analysis is carried out by assuming that from the
concedent’s point of view, a euro in the pocket of consumers and a euro in the
hand of public authorities are equally valuable.
Although the paper focuses on concessions, our analysis is related to the
literature on procurement, namely to the branch of the literature which considers how to include quality other than sale price in the procurement process
(Laffont and Tirole, 1987; Che, 1993). In particular, Che shows that the optimal buying mechanism distorts quality provided by the suppliers downwards
relative to the first best levels. In other words, the buyer, acting as if she does
not care about quality, may reduce the dispersion between suppliers and thus
increase the level of procurement competition. Hence, if we interpret the construction time as an indicator of the procured project "quality" (Herbesman
et al., 1995; Arditi et al., 1997), Che’s results suggest that the regulator may
benefit from a reduced sale price in exchange for a project completion delay.
The paper contributes to concession literature in two ways. First, like
Che, our findings suggest that concessioning without imposing the obligation
to immediately supply the market (acting as if "quality" does not matter)
may provide a higher expected value. Secondly, however, time flexibility per
se does not involve a higher social value. For instance, besides depending on
the consumers’ maximum willingness-to-pay for the service ("the reservation
price"), and the level of competition, the potential welfare gains arising by
allowing the winning bidder to decide when to operate the service are affected
by the bidding rule. Coeteris paribus, when both the reservation price and
competition are relatively low, allowing the franchisee to decide the date of
service launch tends to provide a higher expected value, provided the concession is allocated according to the lowest price criterion. In contrast, the
highest fee criterion may be more appropriate to allocate concessions which
7

In our two-period model, the former concession arrangement may also be interpreted
as an approximation of contracts which imposes the obligation to operate the service, but
gives a certain amount of time flexibility. The second arrangement is an approximation of
contracts which does not impose the obligation to supply the market, but gives the licensee
a limited amount of time to start using the exclusive right of exercise, after which it will be
cancelled.
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do not impose rollout obligations when the number of bidders is relatively
high. Finally, whatever the level of competition is, when the reservation price
is relatively high, awarding authorities should impose rollout time limits and
allocate the contract according to the lowest price criterion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model
and describes the concession value, with and without time-flexibility. Section
3 looks at the bidding process, and Section 4 focuses on the expected welfare
value of alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions. Section 5
concludes and the Appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.

2

The concession value

Consider a natural monopoly industry facing demand uncertainty which is
beyond the supplier’s control. The infrastructure service under consideration
is fairly standard, i.e. the supplier is unable to exercise any degree of discretion
with respect to the type of investment to be undertaken and product quality.8
The service can be operated only by acquiring an exclusive right of exercise
auctioned by a public authority (hereafter "the government"). Depending on
the bidding rule, the franchise will be awarded to the applicant proposing the
lowest cost to the consumers ("the price"), or offering the highest up-front
payment to the government ("the fee"). In both formats, if there are more
bidders that submit the same price (fee), then a random drawing determines
the winner.
Before focussing on the two award criteria, we derive the private value of
the contract, by taking the price as given and by ignoring the fee. We make
the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 To operate the service the concessionaire must afford a capital
cost I. The instantaneous investment is sunk, it can neither be changed,
nor temporarily stopped, nor shut down. Operating and maintenance
costs are comparatively small and set to zero.
Assumption 2 The price (p) offered by the winning bidder is constant over
the franchise term.
8

An example is provided by toll roads. Demand for a highway is largely beyond the
franchise holder, traffic forecasts are notoriously imprecise, and it is difficult to make accurate traffic predictions especially in the long term (Engel, Fisher, and Galetovic, 2001).
Moreover, the service is fairly standard, and there is a limited scope for creativity on the
part of an operator.

5

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

5

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 284 [2009]

Assumption 3 At any time t ≥ 0 there is a mass yt of identical consumers.
Each consumer has an inelastic demand for one unit of the service up to
some reservation price pmax .
Assumption 4 The timing of the demand is as follows. Current demand
(t = 0) is y0 . At t = 1 it may either rise to (1 + u)y0 with probability q ,
or decrease to (1 − d)y0 with probability 1 − q (where u > 0, 0 < d < 1
and q ∈ (0, 1)):
ր y1+ = (1 + u)y0

with probability q

y0
ց

y1− = (1 − d)y0 with probability 1 − q

We first derive the concession value when the franchisee faces the obligation
to operate the service immediately. By indicating with ρ > 0 the constant
discount rate, we get the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The concession expected Net Present Value at t = 0 is :
NP V 0 = pK0 − I ≡ (p − p̃)K0
where:
I
p̃ ≡
,
K0

and

(1)




1+u
1−d
+ (1 − q)
y0
K0 ≡ 1 + q
1+ρ
1+ρ

Proof. Straightforward
Consider now the case where the franchisee does not face the obligation to
supply the market. In this case, the condition NP V 0 > 0 is no longer sufficient for immediately undertaking the required investment, since it does not
account for the franchisee’s ability to react to unfavorable market conditions,
i.e. demand falling short of expectations. Since in our setting a period is sufficient to obtain information on investment profitability, the decision to wait is
economically significant only if operating the service becomes profitable under
the upward realization of the demand level (y1+ ). From now on we restrict the
I
analysis to this case only, i.e. we assume that py0 1−d
< 1+ρ
< py0 1+u
(Dixit
1+ρ
1+ρ
and Pindyck, 1994, p. 40-41).
Lemma 2 The concession expected Net Present Value at t = 1 as of today is:
q
NP V 1 = p(K0 − K1 ) −
I ≡ (p − p̃)K0 + (p̂ − p)K1
(2)
1+ρ
where:

1+ρ−q I
p̂ ≡
1 + ρ K1

and


1−d
K1 ≡ 1 + (1 − q)
y0
1+ρ


6
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Proof. See Appendix A
By putting (1) and (2) together, we get the concession value, which accounts for how much the option to delay the service operation is worth.
Proposition 1 For any given p, the concession value at t = 0 is:


V (p) = max NP V 0 , N P V 1
≡ (p − p̃)K0 + max [(p̂ − p)K1 , 0]

(3)

Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 1 and 2.
The second term on the r.h.s. (3) represents the option value embedded in
a contract which does not impose the obligation to immediately afford sunk
capital costs. Since K0 − K1 > 0, by defining p̄ ≡ φp̃ + (1 − φ)p̂, where
0
1
φ ≡ K0K−K
> 1 and (1 − φ) ≡ − K0K−K
< 0,9 equation (3) can be rewritten as
1
1
follows:
V (p) = max[(p − p̃)K0 , (p − p̄)(K0 − K1 )].
(4)
K0
> 1 and
Finally, for the rest of the paper we assume that p̂p̃ ≡ 1+ρ−q
1+ρ K1
p̄
q
0
≡ 1+ρ K0K−K
< 1, which ensure that 0 < p̄ < p̃ < p̂, and imply the following
p̃
1
optimal decision rule (See Figure 1):

 if p > p̂ it is optimal to invest at t = 0
if p̄ < p < p̂ it is optimal to invest at t = 1

if p < p̄ it is never optimal to invest .
9

It is easy to see that p̄ ≡

q
I
1+ρ K0 −K1

>0

7
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Figure 1: The NPV with time flexibility

3

Award criteria and rollout obligations

A firm can operate the service only after submitting a successful bid. We
consider the following alternative first-price-sealed-auction formats:10
• The concession is awarded to the bidder offering the Lowest Price (hereafter LP award rule, or LP).
• The concession is awarded to the bidder offering the Highest Fee (HF).
10

We do not derive the optimal procedure to award a monopoly franchise (see Riordan
and Sappington, 1987; Laffont and Tirole, 1987; McAffe and McMillan,1987), and we only
consider a first-price auction, in order to examine the welfare properties of alternative specifications for the financial proposals.

8
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These bidding rules will be compared by considering the following alternative concessioning conditions:
• The service must be operated at t = 0, i.e. the winning bidder is not
allowed to delay the investment (Case I ).
• The concession does not impose roll-out requirements, i.e. the winning
bidder acquires the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing
(Case II ).
We conclude the model set-up by adding the following assumptions.
Assumption 5 There are N > 1 competing firms.
Assumption 6 Each bidder i (i = 1, 2, ...N ) observes y0 and the multiplicative parameters (u, d), knows the distribution (q, 1−q) and the realization
of the investment cost Ii , and only knows that Ij , j = i are independent
random variables, with the same absolutely continuous distribution G,
with positive density g over the interval I = [I l ≥ 0, I u ] ⊆ R+ . For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that capital costs are uniformly distributed
on I, with I l = 0.11
u

I
Assumption 7 pmax ≥ p̃u ≡ K
, i.e. the reservation price is such that it
0
would ensure a non-negative concession value to the less efficient bidder,
even when the contract imposes the obligation to immediately operate
the service.

Assumption 8 Bidders are not subject to any liquidity or budget constraints,
so that each firm i has sufficient resources to pay the up-front fee after
winning the auction.
Finally, rollout obligations are verifiable and enforceable, the price (or alternatively the up-front fee) offered by the winning bidder cannot be renegotiated, and all aspects of the bidding situation are known to the government
except for investment costs Ii (i = 1, 2, ...N) known only by each firm itself.
11

None of the results depend on the assumption that G(I) is a uniform distribution as
long as I + G(I)
g(I) is a monotone increasing function (Krishna, 2002, p.69).

9
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3.1

Case I

When the government imposes the obligation to operate the service immediately, LP implies that the firms’ pricing problem reduces to a Bertrand game
where each bidder picks up the lowest price p that maximizes her expected net
present value as defined in (1):


0
(5)
max N P V (pi ; p̃i ) Pr min pj ≥ pi
pi

j=i

The equilibrium strategy is summarized in the following Proposition.

Proposition 2 When the concessionaire must immediately operate the service, the LP award rule involves the following unique symmetric equilibrium
strategy rule:
1
1
(6)
pi = p(p̃i ) ≡ (1 − )p̃i + p̃u ≤ p̃u
N
N
Proof. See Appendix B
Going back to the definition of N P V 0 , since by assumption 7 the threshold
levels p̃i are distributed uniformly within the support P̃ = [0, p̃u ], equation (6)
implies that N P Vi0 are also uniformly distributed over the interval [0, NP Vu0 ],
with interim profits positive for all types except the less efficient firm, which
never wins and whose N P Vl0 is equal to zero even if it does win. By substituting (6) back into NP Vi0 , (1) can be rewritten as a function of the proposed
price:
1
NP Vi0 ≡
(p̃u − p(p̃i ))K0
(7)
N −1
In other words, the bidder offering the lowest price is the one with the highest
N P V 0.
Under HF, firms will bid on the basis of the monopoly price. For instance,
since the franchisee will be able to fix the price up to the reservation price,
conditionally on pmax , we obtain the proposed fee (R) by maximizing:




0 max
0
0
0
max
N P V (p ; p̃i ) − Ri Pr max R j ≤ Ri
(8)
0
j=i

Ri

The equilibrium strategy is summarized in the following Proposition.

Proposition 3 When the concessionaire must immediately operate the service, the HF award rule involves the following unique symmetric equilibrium
strategy rule:
Ri0 =

N −1
N − 1 max
N P Vi0 ≡
(p
− p̃i )K0
N
N

(9)

10
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Proof. See Appendix C
By substituting (9) back into (8), the net benefit [NP V 0 (pmax ; p̃i ) − R0i ]
can be rewritten as a function of the threshold levels p̃i :
N P V 0 (pmax ; p̃i ) − Ri0 ≡

1 max
− p̃i )K0
(p
N

(10)

Since p̃i are distributed uniformly within the support P̃ = [0, p̃u ], the bidder
reporting the highest fee is the one with the highest net benefit.

3.2

Case II

When the contract does not impose the obligation to immediately supply the
market, under LP the bidders’ pricing problem can still be described as a
Bertrand game, where the concession value to be maximized is now given by
V (pi ) = max [NP V 0 , N P V 1 ]. In other words, each agent selects two prices
contingent to the investment time, and reports the one that maximizes her
probability of winning the auction, i.e. poption
= min [p(p̃i ), p(p̄i )].
i
The equilibrium strategy is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 When the concessionaire does not face the obligation to immediately operate the service, the LP award rule involves the following unique
symmetric equilibrium strategy rule:
poption
≡ p(p̄i ) = (1 −
i

1
1
)p̄i + p̄u ≤ p̄u
N
N

(11)

Proof. See Appendix D
By direct inspection of (6) and (11), we can show that:
p(p̄i ) ≤ p(p̃i ),

for all i.

(12)

Disequality (12) implies that competing by maximizing N P Vi1 is a dominant strategy when the price plays a key role in winning the auction. In other
words, under LP firms always exploit time flexibility. By doing so, bidders are
able to submit a price (p(p̄i )) lower than the one they would have offered if
the government had asked immediate rollout of the service.
By substituting (11) back in N P Vi1 , (2) can be rewritten as a function of
the proposed price:
NP Vi1 ≡

1
(p̄u − p(p̄i ))(K0 − K1 )
N −1

(13)

11
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Again, the bidder with the lowest price is the one with the highest NP V 1 .
Similarly, under HF, each agent selects two fees contingent to the investment time and reports the one that maximizes her probability of winning the
auction, i.e. Roption
= max [R0i , Ri1 ]. The equilibrium strategy is summarized
i
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 When the concessionaire does not face the obligation to immediately operate the service, the HF award criterion involves the following
unique symmetric equilibrium strategy rule:
 option
Ri
= R0i if pmax ≥ p̂i
(14)
Rioption = R1i if pmax < p̂i
where Ri0 in given by (9), and Ri1 =

N−1
N

[(pmax − p̄i )(K0 − K1 )] .

Proof. See Appendix D
As in Case I, by substituting (14) back into (8), it is easy to show that the
bidder reporting the highest fee is the one with the highest net benefit.
According to Proposition 5, and by direct inspection of Ri0 and Ri1 we can
conclude that the unique symmetric equilibrium strategy rule for all bidders
is:
 option
Ri
= Ri0
for all i, if pmax ≥ p̂u
option
Ri
= max [Ri0 , R1i ] for all i, if p̃u < pmax < p̂u
To put Proposition 4 and 5 into words, whilst auctioning a contract
which does not impose rollout obligations always induces all bidders to lower
the price charged to consumers (poption
< pi ), it does not necessarily provide
i
a higher fiscal revenue. For instance, if the reservation price (the investment
cost, Ii ) is sufficiently high (low), i.e. if pmax ≥ p̂u , all bidders will offer
the same fee they would have reported when bidding for a concession which
imposes the obligation to immediately operate the service (Roption
= Ri0 ).
i
Generally speaking, the higher the reservation price, the lower tends to be
the additional fiscal revenue arising from allowing the franchisee to optimally
decide the date of service launch.

4
4.1

Welfare analysis
Case I

Let us first consider the case where the concedent authority imposes rollout
time limits. In order to compare the expected social value (W ) arising from
12
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the two bidding rules, we assume that from the government’s point of view,
a euro in the pocket of consumers and a euro of fiscal revenue are equally
valuable.
By indicating with S0 the consumer surplus when the concessionaire operates the service at t = 0, i.e. immediately after winning the auction:
1
0

S =
t=0

1
(1 + ρ)t

pmax

E0 (yt )dp
pi (p̃i )

we get the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 When the concessionaire must immediately operate the service,
i) the LP award rule provides the following expected welfare value:
2
WLP = E[S0 ] = (pmax −
p̃u )K0
N +1
ii) the HF award rule provides the following expected welfare value:
N − 1 max
N −1
WHF = E[R0 ] =
p K0 +
(pmax − p̃u )K0
N +1
N(N + 1)
Proof. See Appendix F
0
Defining ∆WLP/HF
= E[S0 ] − E[R0 ], by assumption 8 and Lemma 3, we
get the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 When the concessionaire must immediately operate the service,
0
∆WLP/HF
= 0,
if pmax = p̃u
and

1 max
− p̃u )K0 > 0
if pmax > p̃u
(p
N
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 3
To put the Proposition into words, the two bidding rules provide the same
expected value when the reservation price (pmax ) is equal to the price which
would make the concession net present value for the less efficient bidder equal
to zero (p̃u ). Otherwise, LP will always provide the highest value. Moreover,
comparative statics shows that the higher (the lower) the reservation price
(the level of competition) is, the higher are the additional benefits arising
from LP.12 For instance:
0
∆WLP/HF
=

0
∂∆WLP/HF

∂pmax
12

> 0 and

0
∂∆WLP/HF

∂N

<0

An example is provided by water services. Because of their essential nature, and since

13
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4.2

Case II

Let us now consider the case where the regulator does not impose time limits
for the provision of the concessioned service. We still assume that the government does not attach different weights to the consumer surplus and the fiscal
revenue.
Since under LP all bidders will exploit time flexibility, by indicating the
consumer surplus with S1 , evaluated at t = 1, and only for yt+ :13

pmax
1
1
S =q
y + dp
(1 + ρ) pi (p̄i ) t
we get the following Lemma.

Lemma 4 When the concessionaire does not face the obligation to immediately operate the service,
i) the LP award rule provides the following expected welfare value
WLP = E[S1 ] ≡ (pmax −

2
p̄u )(K0 − K1 )
N +1

ii) the HF award criterion provides the following expected welfare value:

if pmax ≥ p̂u
E[R0 ]
option
WHF = E[R
]=
N−1
E[R0 ] − N(N+1)
(pmax − p̂u )K1 if p̃u < pmax < p̂u
where E[R0 ] ≡

N−1 max
p K0
N+1

+

N −1
(pmax
N (N+1)

− p̃u )K0

Proof. See Appendix F
1
By defining ∆WLP/HF
= E[S1 ] − E[Roption ], according to Lemma 4 and
substituting the expressions for E[S1 ] and E[R0 ], we get the following Proposition.
the concessionaire does not face competition from other service modes, the reservation price
tends to be relatively high. Moreover, because of the highly specialized nature of this
industry, competition to acquire a concession is relatively low. For example, in Italy, between
1998 and 2005 in regions where new water services were assigned by competitive bidding, the
average number of bidders was 1.2 (Dipartimento per le Politiche di Sviluppo - UVAL, 2006).
Generally, concedent authorities adopted the lowest price award rule, but some authority
referred to the highest fee. Since, in Italy, water concessions involve stringent investment
plans and service launch obligations, the choice of latter award criterion does not appear
consistent with our results.
13

In other words, by assuming that the interest rate (ρ) reflects the government’s time
preferences, the social cost (the "quality loss") stemming from allowing the franchisee to
delay the operation of the service is captured by discounting the expected consumer surplus.

14
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Proposition 7 When the concessionaire does not face the obligation to immediately operate the service
N −1 u
p̂ K1
N +1
(pmax − p̂u )K1

1
0
∆WLP/HF
= ∆WLP/HF
−

−

1+

N−1
N(N+1)

(pmax − p̂u )K1

if pmax > p̂u
if p̃u < pmax < p̂u

Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 4
Unlike the previous case, when the government does not impose rollout
time limits, we cannot say that one or the other award rule is better, insofar
1
the sign of ∆WLP/HF
strongly depends on the level of competition (N ). In
particular, it is easy to show that whatever is the the value of pmax :
1
∂∆WLP/HF

<0
∂N
i.e. as the number of bidders increase, it is more profitable (or less disadvantageous) to use HF rather than LP.
As for the reservation price, it is easy to prove that:
 1
1
∂∆WLP/HF
K − K1
if pmax > p̂u
N 0
=
N−1
1
K − K1 − N(N+1)
K1 if p̃u < pmax < p̂u
∂pmax
N 0
While for relatively low values of N, the higher the reservation price is, the
higher tend to be the potential benefits of LP with respect to HF (i.e.
1
∂∆WLP
/HF

1
∂∆WLP
/HF

∂pmax

>

0), the reverse applies when N is sufficiently high ( ∂pmax < 0). In other
words, unlike a contract which imposes service launch requirements, when the
winning bidder is allowed to decide the date of service launch, if the competitive pressure is sufficiently high, the higher pmax is, the higher tend to be the
relative benefits arising by granting the contract according to the HF award
rule.

4.3

Time-flexibility vs. no time-flexibility

We conclude the analysis by comparing the two concessioning conditions. To
do so, we evaluate the difference between the expected welfare value from the
two award criteria, with and without time-flexibility.
Proposition 8 i) Under the LP award rule, the differential expected welfare
value arising from allowing the winning bidder to decide the date of service
15
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launch is:
1

0

max

E[S ] − E[S ] = −(p

2
−
p̂u )K1 ≡
N +1



<0
?

if pmax ≥ p̂u
if p̃u < pmax < p̂u

ii) Under the HF award rule, the differential expected welfare value arising
from allowing the winning bidder to decide the date of service launch is:

0
if pmax ≥ p̂u
option
0
E[R
] − E[R ] =
N −1
max
u
− N(N+1) (p
− p̂ )K1 > 0 if p̃u < pmax < p̂u
Proposition 8 confirms the intuition that imposing rollout time limits may
or may not provide higher expected value, depending on the financial criterion
used to allocate the contract. Specifically, whatever the discount rate (ρ > 0),
when the contract is allocated according to LP, imposing time limits tends
2
to provide a higher social value. This is always true for pmax ≥ N+1
p̂u , and
holds over the entire range as N increases a bit. On the contrary, under
HF, auctioning a contract which does not impose rollout obligations provides
higher fiscal revenue, although the additional revenue arising from allowing
the winning bidder to decide the date of service launch tends to vanish as the
reservation price increases.

5

Final remarks

Concession arrangements and award procedures can take different forms and
entail various legal and economic issues. In this paper we have focused on
competitive bidding mechanisms, by comparing two award criteria, "the lowest
price to consumers" (LP) and "the highest concession fee" (HF), and two
alternative concessioning conditions, namely a contract which imposes service
launch requirements and a contract which simply assigns the right, as distinct
from the obligation, to supply the market.
We have shown that the expected returns arising from these bidding rules
may be significantly affected by the concessioning conditions, and viceversa.
In other words, when deciding whether or not to impose service launch requirements, governments should take into account which specifications will be
included in the financial proposals. The main findings and policy implications
can be summarised as follows.
If the government focuses on rollout speed, i.e. when concedent authorities
impose the obligation to immediately operate the concessioned service, and do
not assign different weights to the consumer surplus and fiscal revenues, the
16
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concession should be awarded by adopting the LP bidding rule: the lower (the
higher) the level of competition N (the reservation price, pmax ) is, the higher
will be the additional benefits arising from this financial criterion.
In contrast, when the government does not impose rollout obligations, the
relative benefits arising from the two bidding rules strongly depend on the level
of competition. Whilst when bidders do not face a sufficiently high competitive
pressure, LP still provides the highest expected value, the reverse applies when
N is relatively high. Moreover, when bidders face competitive pressure, the
higher pmax is, the higher will be the additional potential benefits arising from
HF.
If the government wishes to raise funds, i.e. when concedent authorities
choose the concessionaire according to HF, it is never appropriate to impose
rollout requirements, although the additional fiscal benefits arising from allowing the winning bidder to decide the date of service launch tend to vanish
as pmax increases.
In contrast, if the government wants to maximise consumer surplus, we
cannot generally say which concessioning condition provides the highest value.
However, the higher pmax is, the more appropriate appears to be imposing
rollout commitments and, unlike HF, as pmax increases, benefits also increase
from contracts which impose stringent service launch requirements.
Our results appear to be broadly consistent with actual practice. For instance, when concessioning socially relevant services, such as the operation of
a water system in a municipality, which do not face competition from other
service modes, awarding authorities generally impose stringent service obligations and select the concessionaire according to the lowest-price criterion. By
contrast, when allocating spectrum licences, which generally involve less stringent service launch requirements, governments usually grant the concessions
to the bidders offering the highest fee.
However, we do have examples of socially significant services which have
been concessioned by imposing stringent investment and rollout obligations,
according to the HF bidding rule. Our findings suggest that this practice
is generally inappropriate, unless concessioning takes place within a broader
regulatory framework which includes a relatively low "price cap" for the monopolistic winning bidder, provided the regulated pmax does not significantly
affect (reduce) the number of potential investors (N).

17
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Appendix
A

Proof of Lemma 2

The flow of profits that the concessionaire will receive once the investment is
undertaken is simply:
π(yt ) = pyt

for t = 0, 1

(15)

and, according to Assumptions 3 and 4, the time evolution of the instantaneous
profit function becomes:
ր
π0

π+
1 = (1 + u)py0 with probability q
(16)

ց π−
1 = (1 − d)py0 with probability 1 − q

If the concessionaire is allowed to postpone the investment decision, the
bidder has to consider this option value that must be included as part of the
total cost of the investment in evaluating the NP V at time zero. Operatively,
the bidder will compare the NP V 0 with the N P V 1 at t = 1 as of today,
evaluated only for π +
1:


1+u
I
1
NPV = q
py0 −
(17)
1+ρ
1+ρ
The overall project value is then given by:


max N P V 0 , NP V 1

By (18), it is possible to calculate the firm’s option value to wait as:




OP 0 = max N P V 0 , NP V 1 − N P V 0 = max NP V 1 − NP V 0 , 0

(18)

(19)

If N P V 1 − N P V 0 > 0 it is optimal to wait one period and decide to invest at
t = 1 only in the case of good news. If, on the contrary, N P V 1 − NP V 0 < 0
it is optimal to invest at t = 0. Then, by imposing NP V 0 (p̂) = N P V 1 (p̂),
(19) can be rewritten as follows:
OP 0 = max [(p̂ − p)K1 , 0]

(20)

18

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper284

18

Moretto and Dosi: Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service L

where p̂ ≡

1+ρ−q I
1+ρ K1



y0 . Substituting (20) back into
and K1 ≡ 1 + (1 − q) 1−d
1+ρ

(19) and solving for NP V 1 we get:
NP V

1



1+ρ−q
= N P V + OP = pK0 − I + max
I − pK1 , 0
1+ρ
≡ (p − p̃)K0 + max [(p̂ − p)K1 , 0]
0

0



This concludes the proof.

B

Proof of Proposition 2

Consider firm i’ bidding decision and suppose that all other firms use the
symmetric strategy p(p̃j ) ∀j = i that specifies every bidder’s willingness-topay.
Since a bid pi is a best response at p̃i (i.e. Ii ) by firm i if it maximizes its
expected payoff against the rivals’ strategies p(p̃j ), ∀j = i, than for any feasible
bid (p), the pricing rule is given by:


0
(21)
pi = arg max NP V (pi ; p̃i ) Pr min p(p̃j ) ≥ pi
j=i

We show that a price strategy for firm i is a symmetric function p(p̃i ) mapping
from the set of firm types P̃ = [0, p̃u ] to the set of possible prices P ⊂ R+ .Yet,
for each firm i this function is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing
with the property that p′ (p̃i ) < 1 and p(p̃u ) = p̃u .
Let us assume that each bidder makes rational conjectures about the distribution of the rivals’ prices represented by a common distribution function
F (p), which is strictly increasing on the interval P ⊂ R+ , and the hazard
f (p)
is increasing in p. This assumption allows definition of
rate h(p) ≡ 1−F
(p)
(N−1)
F
(pi ) ≡ 1 − (1 − F (pi ))N−1 as the cumulative distribution (with density
f (N−1) (pi )) of the minimum of the N − 1 rivals’ price, i.e., the probability that
all the other bidders set lower tariffs than i on the same support P. Consequently, firm i ’s expected payoff (21) is:
(pi − p̃i )K0 (1 − F (pi ))N−1

(22)

Maximizing (22) with respect to pi gives the necessary condition:
(1 − F (pi ))N−1 [1 − (N − 1)(pi − p̃i )h(pi )] = 0

19
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from which we get:
pi = p̃i +

1
(N − 1)h(pi )

(23)

By the assumption h′ (pi ) > 0 the second order condition is always satisfied,
i.e.,: −(pi − p̃i )h′ (pi ) − h(pi ) < 0.
Since the costs are uniformly distributed on I = [0, I u ], also p̃i are distributed uniformly within the support P̃ = [0, p̃u ]. Furthermore, the less efficient
firm knows for certain that it will lose the auction, then h(p) → ∞ and from
(23) we get pi → p̃u : i.e., the firm has a project value that is too low to win
−1
i
and then fixes as price p = p̃u . Finally, dp
=−
> 0 and < 1.
h′ (pi )
dp̃i
1+

(N −1)h(pi )2

So far we have assumed that Ii (i.e. p̃i ) is private information, but used the
distribution F (.) over the rivals’ price strategies to derive the firm i optimal
price. To characterize the link between the distribution of Ii (p̃i ) and the firm’s
conjecture on output prices we impose:
F (pi ) = G(p̃i ) =

p̃i
Ii
≡ u
u
p̃
I

(24)

We need to ensure that the function pi (.) of the random variable Ii (i.e. p̃i )
is itself a random variable and to induce the distribution of pi from the distribution of Ii (i.e. p̃i ). This procedure is an example of the distributional
strategies approach introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1985). Since the investment costs are uniformly distributed over I = [0, I u ], by (24) and the
hazard rate, we get:
1

h(pi ) ≡
from which:

f(pi )
dp̃i
p̃u
=
p̃i
1 − F (pi )
1 − p̃u dpi

dpi
1
1
=
u
dp̃i
h(pi ) p̃ − p̃i

By (23):
(p̃u − p̃i )

dpi
1
=
≡ (N − 1)(pi − p̃i )
dp̃i
h(pi )

(25)

This equality can be expressed as a first order differential equation in p(p̃) as:
p′ (p̃)(p̃u − p̃i ) − p(p̃)(N − 1) + p̃(N − 1) = 0

(26)

with the boundary condition that p(p̃u ) = p̃u . By the linearity of (26) we can
try the solution:
p(p̃) = Ap̃ + B
(27)
20
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Substituting (27) in (26) and rearranging we get:
A(p̃u − p̃i ) − (Ap̃ + B)(N − 1) + p̃(N − 1) = 0
[−A − A(N − 1) + (N − 1)]p̃ + Ap̃u − B(N − 1) = 0
N−1
N

from which, defining A =

and B =

p(p̃i ) = (1 −

p̃u
,
N

we get:

1
1
)p̃i + p̃u
N
N

(28)

Finally, substituting (28) into (1), the NP Vi0 becomes:
NP Vi0 ≡ (pi − p̃i )K0 ≡

1 u
(p̃ − p̃i )K0
N

(29)

From (29) the weakest firm does not give any value to the project, i.e. NP Vl0 ≡
1
(p̃u − p̃u )K0 = 0. This concludes the proof.
N

C

Proof of Proposition 3

Since the thresholds p̃i are distributed uniformly within P̃= [0, p̃u ], the bidding problem becomes equivalent to the case where each bidder i assigns
a value to the project which is also distributed uniformly over the interval
[N P Vl0 , NP Vu0 ]. The equilibrium strategy calls upon a firm to bid a constant
fraction of its N P V (Krishna, 2002, p. 19), i.e.:
Ri0 =

N −1
N − 1 max
NP Vi0 ≡
[(p
− p̃i )K0 ]
N
N

This concludes the proof.

D

Proof of Proposition 4

Proposition 4 can be proven following the proof of Proposition 2. The pricing
rule is obtained by maximizing the expected project value. In particular, each
bidder should maximize the project value as defined in (4):
max V (pi )(1 − F (pi ))N−1
pi

or equivalently:
max {max[(pi − p̃i )K0 , (pi − p̄i )(K0 − K1 )]} (1 − F (pi ))N−1 .
pi
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The optimal price strategy is then given by:
poption
= min [p(p̃i ), p(p̄i )]
i

(30)
N P Vi0

where p(p̃i ) is the price when the firm maximizes the
and p(p̄i ) stands
1
for the price when it maximizes the NP Vi . Since Lemma 3 provides p(p̃i ), we
need to derive the pricing rule that maximizes:
max[(pi − p̄i )(K0 − K1 )](1 − F (pi ))N −1
pi

The first order condition for this case is:
(1 − F (pi ))N−1 [(K0 − K1 ) − (N − 1)[(pi − p̃i )K0 + (p̂i − pi )K1 ]h(pi )] = 0
from which we get:
K0
K1
1
p̃i −
p̂i +
K0 − K1
K0 − K1
(N − 1)h(pi )
1
= p̄i +
(N − 1)h(pi )

pi =

(31)

Since h′ (pi ) > 0, the second order condition is always satisfied, i.e.: −[(pi −
p̃i )K0 + (p̂i − pi )K1 ]h′ (pi ) − (K0 − K1 )h(pi ) < 0. As costs are uniformly distributed on I = [0, I u ] also p̄i are distributed uniformly in P̄ = [0, p̄u ]. The firm
with p̄u has a project value that is too low to win, i.e., the less efficient firm
knows for certain that it will lose the auction, then h(p) → ∞ and from (31)
−1
i
pi → p̄u .Finally, we get dp
=−
> 0 and < 1.
h′ (pi )
dp̄i
1+

(N −1)h(pi )2

Simple verification shows that from (24) we obtain a first order differential
equation in p(p̄) similar to (26), from which it is easy to get the price rule (11)
in the text. Substituting p(p̄) into (2) the NP Vi1 becomes:
1
N P Vi1 = (pi − p̄i )(K0 − K1 ) ≡ (p̄u − p̄i )(K0 − K1 )
(32)
N
which is also distributed uniformly in [0, NP Vu1 ], with N P Vl1 ≡ N1 (p̄u −
p̄u )(K0 − K1 ) = 0.
Finally, recalling that by assumption 5 we get p̄i ≤ p̃i ≤ p̂i , the following
disequality p(p̄i ) < p(p̃i ) is always satisfied for all i, i.e.:
1
1
1
1
(1 − ) [φp̃i + (1 − φ)p̂i ] + [φp̃u + (1 − φ)p̂u ] < (1 − )p̃i + p̃u
N
N
 N
  N

1
1 u
1
1 u
(φ − 1) (1 − )p̃i + p̃ − (1 − )p̂i + p̂
< 0
N
N
N
N
This concludes the proof.
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E

Proof of Proposition 5

Since the thresholds p̃i and p̄i are distributed uniformly within P̃ = [0, p̃u ] and
P̄ = [0, p̄u ], the bidding equilibrium strategy requires reporting of a fee that is
a constant fraction of the max(N P V 0 , N P V 1 ). That is:




N −1
Rioption =
max N P Vi0 , NP Vi1 ≡ max Ri0 , Ri1
N
N−1
0
max
where Ri = N [(p
− p̃i )K0 ] and Ri1 = N−1
[(pmax − p̄i )(K0 − K1 )] . In
N
addition, taking the difference Ri0 − Ri1 , we get:
N − 1 max
N − 1 max
[(p
− p̃i )K0 ] −
[(p
− p̄i )(K0 − K1 )] (33)
N
N
N − 1 max
[p
=
− p̂i ] K1
N
where the last equality follows from the fact that p̄i ≡ φp̃i + (1 − φ)p̂i , where
0
1
φ ≡ K0K−K
> 1 and (1 − φ) ≡ − K0K−K
< 0.
1
1
0
1
From (33) each will report Ri > Ri if pmax > p̂i and on the contrary it
will report Ri1 if pmax < p̂i . Therefore if pmax > p̂u than Ri0 > Ri1 for all i and
Rioption = Ri0 . This concludes the proof.
Ri0 − R1i =

F

Proof of Lemmas 3 and 4

Let us first consider the expected consumer surplus. We need to distinguish
between the LP bidding rule format with and without time flexibility. Indicating the surplus for the first and second cases by S1 and S0 respectively, we
get:

1
1
pmax
pmax
1
1
0
S = E
yt dp =
E(yt )dp
t
t
(1
+
ρ)
(1
+
ρ)
p
(p̃
)
p
(p̃
)
i
i
i
i
t=0
t=0
1

= (pmax − pi (p̃i ))(y0 +
t=1
max

1
E(yt ) = (pmax − pi (p̃i ))K0
(1 + ρ)t

u

where it must be p
> p̃ (assumption 7) to guarantee that whoever the
0
winner is the surplus S is always positive.
For S1 we get:
1

S



max

p
1
yt+
= q
yt+ dp = (pmax − pi (p̄i ))q
(1 + ρ) pi (p̄i )
(1 + ρ)
max
= (p
− pi (p̄i ))(K0 − K1 )
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where it must be pmax > p̄u (obviously so by assumption 7) to guarantee that
whoever the winner is the surplus S1 is always positive. Since the consumers
do not know the winning bidder, the ex-ante surplus is given by:
E[S0 ] = (pmax − Epi (p̃i ))K0 ≡ (pmax −

2
p̃u )K0
N +1

and:
E[S1 ] = (pmax − Epi (p̄i ))(K0 − K1 ) ≡ (pmax −

2
p̄u )(K0 − K1 )
N +1

2
where E [pi (p̃i )] = N+1
p̃u and E [pi (p̄i )] = N2+1 p̄u (Wolsftetter, 1999, p. 236).
Let us now turn to the expected revenue. Defining Vi = max [N P Vi0 , N P Vi1 ] ,
the bidder i’s expected payment is given by:

N −1
Vi − V l N−1
E(Ri ) = Ri Pr(win) ≡
Vi ( u
)
N
V −Vl
The government earns from each bidder an expected payment E(Ri ). Since the
government does not know the bidders’ valuations, it takes an expected value:
Vu

u

V
1
N −1
1
N
E[E(Ri )] =
E(R (Vi )) u
dV
≡
(
)
Vi (Vi − V l )N−1 dVi
i
l
u−Vl
V
−
V
N
V
l
l
V
V


Vu
u
l N
l N
N −1
(V
−
V
)
(V
−
V
)
1
i
N
u
≡
( u
) V
−
dVi
N
V −Vl
N
N
Vl


N −1
N − 1 NV u + V l
N −1
≡
=
Vu+ 2
Vl
N
N (N + 1)
N (N + 1)
N (N + 1)
1

from which we get:
N −1 u
N −1
V +
Vl
(34)
N +1
N(N + 1)




N −1
N −1
max NP Vu0 , N P Vu1 +
max N P Vl0 , NP Vl1
≡
N +1
N (N + 1)

E[Roption ] = NE[E(Ri )] ≡

Without time flexibility or for pmax > p̂u , (34) reduces to
N
N
N
≡
N

E[R0 ] =

−1
N −1
N P Vu0 +
N P Vl0
+1
N (N + 1)
− 1 max
N −1
p K0 +
(pmax − p̃u )K0
+1
N (N + 1)
24
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While for p̃u < pmax < p̂u , (34) reduces to:
−1
N −1
N P Vu0 +
N P Vl1
+1
N (N + 1)
− 1 max
N −1
(p
− p̃l )K0 +
(pmax − p̄u )(K0 − K1 )
+1
N(N + 1)
N
−
1
≡ E[R0 ] −
(pmax − p̂u )K1 > E[R0 ]
N (N + 1)

N
N
N
≡
N

E[Roption ] =

This concludes the proof.

G

Proof of Proposition 8

Under the LP bidding rule, the difference between the two consumer surpluses
becomes:
2
2
E[S1 ] − E[S0 ] ≡ (pmax −
p̄u )(K0 − K1 ) − (pmax −
p̃u )K0(35)
N +1
N +1


2
≡ −pmax +
p̂u K1
N +1
which is always negative for pmax > p̂u . Under HF, by Lemma 4, the difference
between the two expected fee is:
E[Roption ] − E[R0 ] = 0

if pmax ≥ p̂u

and
E[Roption ] − E[R0 ] = −

N −1
(pmax − p̂u )K1 > 0 if
N (N + 1)

p̃u < pmax < p̂u

This concludes the proof.
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